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In the winter of 1863-64, ten years after Japan’s first ‘Treaty of Amity and Friendship’ with a 
Western power, the Victorians were weighing up the possibility of going to war with the 
country. Back in September 1862 a party of British residents and visitors – three men and a 
woman – had been attacked by samurai at Namamugi village, a short ride east of Yokohama. 
One of the party, a twenty-nine year-old merchant named Charles Richardson, was killed. 
Palmerston’s Government demanded an indemnity, and while the bakufu (the Tokugawa 
Shogunate) agreed to pay its share, Satsuma domain, from which the samurai hailed, did not. 
Late in 1863 news reached London that the Royal Navy, despatched to bolster British 
demands, had engaged in a two day bombardment of the domain’s castle town of Kagoshima, 
resulting in a conflagration ‘illuminating the entire bay’.1 For the Peace Society, events were 
following a wearily familiar pattern: Britain would ‘in all probability’ be embroiled ‘in a 
succession of ignoble and costly wars’.2 The essayist and radical Frederic Harrison feared 
that bombarding Kagoshima would prove insufficient; that, as in the past, ‘to hold our ground 
we shall need to occupy territory’, and so ‘one annexation will necessitate another’.3 Even 
                                                          
1 A. Kuper to E. Neale, 17 Aug. 1863, encl. in E. Neale to J. Russell, 26 Aug. 1863, Foreign Office (FO) 
records, The National Archives, UK (TNA), FO 881/1183. 
2 ‘Memorial to Earl Russell’, The Herald of Peace 164, 1 Sept. 1863, 251. 
3 Harrison, “Destruction of Kagoshima”, 288–289. 
those inclined to sneer at such ‘peace-mongers’ also believed it ‘but too probable that we 
should have to continue our intercourse with the Japanese according to “the holy text of pike 
and gun”’.4 Charles Cookson (who as Consul at Alexandria was himself later caught up in the 
1882 ‘massacre’ and bombardment of that town) also brooded on the likelihood of Britain 
assuming some form of protectorate over part of Japan. It was, he noted with relief, still a far-
off prospect, and yet ‘who, with the experiences of India and China fresh on his mind, can 
say what may be the next step’. For many that winter, Britain teetered on the edge of another 
Asian imbroglio. ‘The India of yesterday is the China of to-day’, another critic warned, ‘and 
the China of to-day the Japan of to-morrow’.5 
Imperialism is not a concept we routinely use to describe British activity in 
bakumatsu and early Meiji Japan. The bombardment of Kagoshima seldom features in 
surveys of British imperialism, even in East Asia. Japan in this period sits uneasily within 
many wider histories of European expansion, and if it does so it is, in part, because we feel 
we know how this story ends. Japan avoided China’s fate; its nineteenth century is often told 
as the story of its ‘Opening’, Meiji ‘modernization’, and imperial expansion in its own right. 
In Japan, this ‘Namamugi Incident’ is the subject of scores of histories, novels and 
dramatizations, and the bombardment of Kagoshima (the Satsu-Ei sensō, or Anglo-Satsuma 
War) forms part of a resilient narrative of national modernisation and the road to the Meiji 
Ishin. It is the short, sharp shock that drives home to the Satsuma domain – vanguard of the 
Ishin – the futility of resisting western trade and ideas, and of the need for a radical 
transformation of political power.6 In Britain, the affair remains little known, and when 
                                                          
4 ‘Editor’s Portfolio’, Colburn’s United Service Magazine and Naval and Military Journal (1864), i, 273–274. 
5 Cookson, “England and Japan”, 460; and Pember, “England and India”, 228. 
6 This particular interpretation of the story has helped to sustain an extensive Japanese literature on the 
‘Namamugi Incident’ (Namamugi Jiken). For a useful introduction, see the work of Hagiwara Nobutoshi, in: N. 
Hagiwara, Satsuei sensō (Tokyo, 1998); and Shika (Tokyo, 2001). Though the incident is often mentioned in 
English-language histories of Japan (and in foreigners’ memoirs of the period), it has few book length 
treatments, save Miyazawa, Englishmen and Satsuma; and my own Fletcher, Namamugi. Ion, “Namamugi” and 
Hashimoto, “Collision” also provide welcome examinations of different aspects of the Incident. 
written about at all is not from the perspective of imperial history, but of that curious sub-
field of diplomatic history, Anglo-Japanese Relations.  
That field has seen a remarkable surge in activity since the 1990s, prompted by a 
programme of events to mark the centenary of the Japan Society in London, and driven 
forward by a number of influential publication projects.7 A five volume History of Anglo-
Japanese Relations, 1600-2000 (2000-2003) explored many questions relevant to imperial 
historians, including Jim Hoare’s survey of the Unequal Treaties era, and the work of Janet 
Hunter, Sugiyama Shinya and Antony Best on Anglo-Japanese commercial and financial 
rivalry.8 The ten volumes of the Britain and Japan: Biographical Portraits series (1994-
2016) have rescued hundreds of lives and careers from obscurity.9 Collectively, this Anglo-
Japanese focus has been welcomed by Japan scholars wary of historians’ tendency to 
concentrate on US-Japan connections to the exclusion of others.10 But this approach is not 
without its constraints, too; recurrent themes in the literature that prefigure the types of 
questions most commonly asked. There is the bilateral framework of analysis itself, for 
example, which can militate against transnational or multi-actor perspectives, and can over 
determine discussions in terms of the rise, fall and return of ‘friendship’ between the two 
countries.11 Historicising the relationship has been hard and valuable work, but a marked 
concern for ‘the chequered relations between our two countries’, or with ‘people who have 
participated for good or ill in the moulding of the bilateral relationship’ has worked to favour 
                                                          
7 For useful surveys of this output, see: Cortazzi, “Britain and Japan”, and Brewer, “Anglo-Japanese Relations”.  
8 This series comprises essays on political-diplomatic relations (vol.s i and ii, 2000, edited by Ian Nish and 
Kibata Yōichi), military relations (vol. iii, 2003, edited by Ian Gow, Hirama Yōichi and John Chapman), 
economic and business relations (vol. iv, 2002, edited by Janet Hunter and Sugiyama Shinya) and social and 
cultural perspectives (vol. v, 2002, edited by Gordon Daniels and Chūshichi Tsuzuki).  
9 The latest volume is: Cortazzi, Britain and Japan.  
10 Garon, “Transnational History”, 73-74.  
11 Kato Yuzo, for example, has stressed the need ‘to understand Japanese-British relations within a multi-actor 
environment’ in this period: Kato, “Opening of Japan”.   
some periods and questions more than others.12 Sometimes, the attention paid to presenting 
‘both sides’ of the story can – not unlike the ‘two island nations’ rhetoric of the Anglo-
Japanese Alliance itself – flatten differences between the parties, or mask asymmetries in 
their power relations. And while the biographical method has an important role in 
illuminating the global and imperial past, it remains important to contextualise these life 
stories within broader patterns and structures of power.13  
This article asks how far we can consider bakumatsu Japan to be subject to forms of 
British imperialism, and what we stand to gain from bringing an imperial history perspective 
to bear on this, in Britain, forgotten conflict. It builds on the work of Sho Konishi and others 
in ‘re-opening’ conventional narratives of the ‘Opening’ of Japan, and takes its cue from 
Sheldon Garon’s recent call to foreground Japan’s transnational connections, and to push 
against narratives of Japanese exceptionalism by exploring its modern history within broader 
frames of analysis.14 It will argue that, in the early 1860s, Japan in fact had a prominent place 
in wider British debates over the ideologies of non-intervention, empire and free trade, with 
both advocates and critics of military intervention giving Japan a place along a spectrum of 
recognisably imperial activity. This was not simply a case of imperial analogies and 
experiences elsewhere being invoked on how best to secure the ‘opening’ of the country. The 
challenges Japan presented to foreign merchants and officials – and British indecision over 
how best to proceed – gave Japan, in turn, a place in wider reflections over Britain’s conduct 
in maritime Asia and its obligations to its merchants, as the prospect of a wider war, even of 
seizing parts of the archipelago, concerned not only Palmerston and his Foreign Secretary, 
                                                          
12 As Cortazzi has explained, the 1600-2000 book series, financed by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
was commissioned to address popular misunderstandings over Japan’s role in the Second World War in 
particular: Cortazzi, “Britain and Japan”, 395.  
13 As editor of volumes IV to X of the Biographical Portraits series, Cortazzi acknowledged that the constraints 
of author availability had precluded the possibility of organising the volumes around particular themes or 
categories, and that significant gaps in coverage remain: Cortazzi, “Britain and Japan”.  
14 Garon, “Transnational History”. These issues were the focus of a 2019 conference on Reopening the 
‘Opening’ of Japan at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, and where I advanced some of the ideas in this paper.  
Lord John Russell, but Richard Cobden, Lord Robert Cecil and many other statesmen and 
commentators of the time.  
 To explore this, this article re-examines the young treaty port of Yokohama in light of 
John Darwin’s concept of the bridgehead, that ‘transmission shaft of imperialism’. In 
Darwin’s work, the bridgehead provides the key to explaining ‘the baffling shape of the 
Victorian empire’; its performance in the face of geopolitical, economic and environmental 
constraints critical to understanding where and when the power of the metropole could be 
‘transmitted to its periphery’.15 Viewed this way, the Yokohama bridgehead of the early 
1860s achieved only fitful purchase; talk of war and annexation in London did not last. Yet 
our understanding of imperialism has as much to gain from studying examples where 
intervention was merely limited, or failed – where the transmission shaft lost torque, span the 
tyres – as where it did not. Re-approaching Yokohama in this way takes up Darwin’s 
challenge to write histories of the British empire mindful of uncertainty, compromise and 
defeat – a history ‘that explains more convincingly how Britain’s imperial world was 
constructed’ – and aware of the ‘terms and conditions’ that bound its horizons.16 It also 
presents an opportunity to ask new questions of the Satsu-Ei senso itself; questions that go 
beyond its significance for Japan to its implications outside the archipelago; questions about 
the conduct of ‘gunboat diplomacy’ and the fault lines of mid-Victorian expansion; the place 
of Japan in British political imaginaries; the nature of informal empire; and the discourses 
buffeting British expansion in the turbulent 1860s.  
 
 
                                                          
15 Darwin, “Imperialism”.  
16 Darwin, Unfinished Empire, 7-8. 
Informal Empire in the Japanese Archipelago 
 
 
In his 2017 reinterpretation of the course of the Meiji Ishin, Mark Ravina framed the politics 
of the late Tokugawa and early Meiji regimes in terms of a decades-long ‘crisis of 
imperialism’. The book focuses on Japanese actors, and stresses the agency of its reformers, 
but is also an invitation to reappraise the place of force – and of the threat of force – in the so-
called ‘opening’ of Japan.17 For Britain’s Japan observers, news of the American expedition 
under Commodore Perry re-opened the question of whether the country had the right to 
withdraw from world trade. Drawing on the stock of literature available to them – from 
Raffles to Kaempfer, and even back to John Saris – they concluded, by and large, that it did 
not, and must now choose between ‘friendly intercourse, or subjugation, sooner or later, by 
one or more of the great powers of the west’.18  
These observers welcomed Perry’s mission as being in the interest of all nations, but 
were equally determined that Britain ‘not be outstripped in the East by the Americans’. 
Some form of national interest was felt to be at stake, and its most obvious form, and that 
which has received the most attention, was trade.19 The framework for British trade was 
outlined by the Elgin Treaty of 1858; Nagasaki, Hakodate and Kanagawa (soon relocated 
across the bay to the purpose-built settlement of Yokohama) were opened the following 
year. It was not long, however, before the idea of calling on the navy to protect British trade 
with Japan became a common refrain in both official despatches and the treaty port press. 
                                                          
17 Ravina, Japan’s Meiji Restoration.  
18 MacFarlane, Japan, 115-116; “Japan and the Japanese”, 31. Alexander Knox, in a similar review of the Japan 
literature for the Edinburgh Review, accepted that the Japanese ‘have an exclusive right to the possession of 
their territory’, but not if they kept other nations from sharing in its wealth: ‘the only secure title to property, 
whether it be in a hovel or an empire, is, that the exclusive possession of one is for the benefit of all’: Knox, 
“Japan”, 383. 
19 Tilley, Japan, 98; MacFarlane, Japan, 125. 
Rutherford Alcock, Britain’s first Minister Plenipotentiary, was still en route to the country 
when he urged the China squadron to station a warship in Japanese waters to ensure ‘a fair 
disposition on the part of the Japanese to give execution to the Treaty’.20 In July 1859, 
during the treaty’s ratification, Alcock insisted that naval officers and men process through 
the streets of Edo, a ‘show of firmness’ in the face of Japanese opposition to underscore ‘the 
entirely new character of foreign relations’.21 In the months that followed merchants 
complained with progressing bitterness of official obstruction, harassment, and the stoppage 
of trade. Alcock, exasperated, declared the Treaty ‘virtually annulled’. By March, 1860, his 
requests for a show of naval power to restart trade had become so common as to breed a 
certain defensiveness at Hong Kong.22  
As we shall see, the bombardment of Kagoshima can be read as the culmination of 
these calls to protect the British merchant, that self-styled ‘pioneer of trade and 
civilization’.23 But the Victorians seldom contemplated military intervention to protect 
private enterprise alone: a larger, ‘national interest’ had to be seen to be at stake. Nor did 
merchants have a monopoly over British designs on Japan. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
theirs was merely the latest in a line of British sub-imperialisms seeking London’s support for 
their activities in these waters.  
The Ryūkyū Kingdom, for example, could by the 1840s be considered the shifting 
maritime frontier of multiple, competing empires.24 This island chain southwest of Kyushu 
(nominally a tributary kingdom to the Qing, but actually under Satsuma’s control on behalf of 
the bakufu) may have been visited by as many as seventy European vessels in the first half of 
                                                          
20 R. Alcock to J. Hope, 3 May 1859, Admiralty (ADM) records, TNA, ADM 125/115. 
21 R. Alcock to Capt. Hand, no. 7, 12 July 1859, ADM 125/115.  
22 R. Alcock to J. Russell, 6 Dec. 1859, ADM 125/115; J. Hope to Lord Paget, 8 Mar. 1860, ADM 125/115. 
23 Japan Herald (JH) 45, 27 Sept. 1862, 178. 
24 Kreiner, Ryukyu in World History. 
the nineteenth-century alone.25 American merchantmen to Canton and the extensive 
American whaling fleet were operating across the North Pacific by the 1830s, and from 1840 
France, too, intensified its efforts to cement commercial and political relations with China.26 
But Britain’s Royal Navy took a particular interest the Ryūkyūs. After 1815 the navy began 
surveying the North Pacific in earnest, while the 1834 abolition of the East India Company’s 
monopoly also triggered fresh Foreign Office interest in these waters, so that numerous 
vessels began to call at the port of Naha —some merchantmen, but predominantly ships of 
war—including the expeditions of Captains Basil Hall in 1817, Frederick Beechey in 1827 
and Edward Belcher in 1845. Indeed, before the Treaty of Nanking had secured the 
acquisition of Hong Kong, the Navy’s search for potential bases ‘free from the oppressions of 
Chinese law’ made Naha an attractive candidate, especially as adverse weather conditions 
frequently drove ships north and east of Taiwan. The visitors’ generally peaceable 
interactions with the authorities here – misinterpreted as straightforward ‘kindness’ by more 
than one captain in need – fuelled a naval habit of viewing Naha as a kind of unofficial 
British safe-haven in the North Pacific, a place that ships in distress knew to steer for to refit 
and repair. (Satsuma, for its part, hungrily consumed the information that arose from these 
encounters).  
By the mid-1840s there had emerged a distinct, informal community of British 
seamen so convinced of the favourable situation of the islands (and of the favourable 
disposition of the islanders) as to request, in the context of the First Opium War, that 
organisations such as the London Missionary Society ‘urge on the Ministers of the Crown 
and on the British public generally’ that the ‘Loochoo Kingdom’ be ceded to Britain as part 
of the spoils of war. A British Ryūkyū, they reasoned, would become a foothold from which 
                                                          
25 Teruya, “Ryukyu”, 262.  
26 Beillevaire, “Wavering Attention”, 185.  
to ‘open wide the great gates of China, Corea and Japan’, especially if bolstered by an active 
missionary presence. When the LMS and Church Missionary Society both declined to back 
such a scheme, the sailors launched a mission of their own – the Loochoo Naval Mission – 
although their missionary’s increasingly fractious relationships with Ryūkyūan authorities 
across his stay (1846-54) put paid to wider hopes of lasting British influence in the islands.27 
Thirteen hundred miles north lay another maritime borderland at the opposite end of 
the Japanese archipelago, where Russian activity would prompt the bakufu into tightening its 
seclusion laws. In the years following 1791-93, when Russia despatched Lieutenant Adam 
Laxman on a mission from Okhotsk to Edo (at the same time Lord Macartney set sail for 
China), Japan’s northern waters became another of those spaces in which British and Russian 
mutual suspicions played out, opening a new round of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Far East. 
Charles Whitworth, Britain’s minister to St. Petersberg, despatched ominous warnings about 
Laxman’s mission and of Russia’s growing power along the Amur river, concluding that 
‘nothing seems more probable, than that they have designs of conquering Japan’.28 He was 
wrong – Laxman was satisfied with far less – but the idea proved stubborn, and Japan came 
to occupy a peculiar place in the Admiralty’s conception of British world system.29 
During the Crimean War, for example, Vice Admiral James Stirling would improvise 
Britain’s first treaty with Japan amid growing concern at Whitehall over Russian strength in 
Japanese waters. Stirling came to Japan to learn if its ports were being used as Russian 
havens, but left with an 1854 Convention giving British warships the right to access Nagasaki 
and Hakodate as ports of call and supply. As the war progressed, and with the Royal Navy 
                                                          
27 See Fletcher, “Returning Kindness Received”.  
28 Cranmer-Byng, “Russian and British Interests”, 365.  
29 The Russian bogeyman featured in even general British writings about Japan into the 1860s. ‘The acquisition 
of Japan would make [Russia] mistress of the Pacific … [I]t would seem…opposed to the mercantile interests of 
the world that this large and important country, abounding as it does with admirable harbours, should ever fall 
beneath the dominion of Russia’: Kemish, Japanese Empire, 281.  
making ready use of these harbours (while denying them to the Russians), Japan became a 
British asset in the wider conduct of the war, and Hakodate, in particular, a British base in all 
but name.30 Stirling’s Convention may have made no mention of trade, and left the merchants 
of London and Shanghai disappointed. And yet, as he explained in November 1855, it had 
conferred real advantages nonetheless:  
 
Last Summer, the Ports and resources of Japan were at the disposal of any Cruiser 
for support, refreshments and communication, and in these respects Japan was as 
useful to us as a British Colony in that locality, but holding as we did the 
superiority in force, these Ports and resources were not available for Russian ships, 
and thus in the first year of its existence we were enabled to turn the Treaty to 
account in our own favour and against the Enemy.31 
 
The British were still largely chasing phantoms: Russia did not attempt a large-scale 
operation in the Far East. But across the rest of bakumatsu era, Japan continued to serve the 
Royal Navy as a kind of listening post for Russian activity, a maritime counterpart to the 
better-known ‘watch and ward’ arrangements on the other side of Asia. At Edo, Alcock 
privately doubted that Russia had designs on Japan per se, but took seriously his 
government’s instructions to observe Russian interactions and ‘obtain information as to 
Russian proceedings in the Amoor and neighbouring countries’.32 From Hakodate, the new 
British Consul Christopher Pemberton Hodgson duly reported the comings and goings of 
                                                          
30 Beasley, “Conflict to Co-operation”, 88. ‘If ever any European power wishes to obtain a pied-à-terre in Japan, 
no better spot could be chosen than Hakodadi [Hakodate]. Easily fortified, with good anchorage, and a 
delightful climate, it offers all the advantages required for such a purpose’: Tilley, Japan, 103.   
31 J. Stirling to Admiralty, no. 75, 8 Nov. 1855, ADM 125/1.  
32 R. Alcock to J. Russell, no. 25, 3 Sept. 1859, ADM 125/115.  
Russian vessels and personnel, convinced that official explanations of their movements were 
‘only the foreground of the plan’.33 It was also from Hakodate that HMS Saracen (1855) and 
then Actaeon and Dove (1859) set out on their survey expeditions of the north, making good 
deficiencies in the Admiralty’s knowledge exposed during the late war.34 The brief Anglo-
French annexation of Urup (1855-56) and the Royal Navy’s expulsion of Russian warships 
from Aso Bay, Tsushima (1861) further underlined Japan’s new-found implication in the 
forward projection of British interests in East Asia.  
 There was another object of wider advantage to be had in the Japanese archipelago, of 
which even the most casual British observers were aware: its fabled mineral wealth, and, 
most especially, its coal. ‘No mineral or other product the Japanese possess could be so 
valuable to us’, Alcock told London in 1859, ‘as a good steady supply of the best coal’.35 
Coal ‘gives wings and life to steam navigation’, MacFarlane enthused from the side-lines as 
the Perry expedition prepared to depart Hampton Roads, and while the American 
Commodore’s firm interest in Japanese coal is well-known (he threatened to occupy the 
Ryūkyū royal palace if refused permission to erect a coal depot, something rightly described 
as ‘the practice of imperialism’), Britain was not far behind.36  
Across the nineteenth-century, the Admiralty became progressively more strategic in 
how it thought about global coal supplies and the projection of British power, and historians 
have pointed to coal sources and stations – and the connections that surrounded and flowed 
through them – as a critical prop to the wider British world system.37 By the 1880s the 
Admiralty had come to favour high-quality Welsh coal to such an extent that it was being 
shipped out from the British Isles to naval stations across and beyond the empire. But the 
                                                          
33 C. Pemberton Hodgson to Senior Naval Officer of HBM Forces Shanghai, 24 April 1860, ADM 125/115. 
34 Beasley, “Conflict to Co-operation”, 95-99. 
35 R. Alcock to J. Russell, no. 28, 20 Sept. 1859, ADM 12/115. 
36 MacFarlane, Japan, 273-5. For ‘the practice of imperialism’ here, see: Ravina, 91-2, especially n20 and n21.  
37 Gray, Steam Power.  
1850s and 60s were years of experimentation, with the Navy keenly investigating alternate, 
local coal supplies in the hope of sourcing cheaper alternatives and diversifying its supply. 
These arrangements often exceeded the bounds of Britain’s formal empire, but were 
nonetheless central to the maintenance of British influence; and for a time, and in the years 
concurrent with its ‘opening’, Japan was afforded an important place within them.  
 It was the challenge and expense of supplying the China squadron during the Second 
Opium War that drew the Navy’s eyes towards Japan. In September 1859, Captain Charles 
Shadwell of HMS Highflyer was despatched to Nagasaki and Hakodate to conduct sea trials 
of local coal. Initial results left something to be desired (these coals burned too quickly, and 
with too much flame and smoke, not unlike ‘inferior North Country coals’), but Shadwell 
held out hope for the future, as Japanese mines were sunk deeper. Even so, and ‘bearing in 
mind the heavy expense of European coals in China’, he recommended their use by Her 
Majesty’s Ships when mixed with Welsh coal.38 A few months later, Rear-Admiral Hope of 
the China Station sent Lt. Malcolm of the Royal Engineers back to Japan ‘to ascertain 
whether any measures can be taken for improving the quality and procuring a large supply 
from thence during the period of the contemplated operations in the North of China’.39  
Hope’s instructions and Malcolm’s meticulous reports offer a remarkable window 
into the tensions surrounding these investigations, and are a reminder of the ways in which 
the interactions around coaling stations, even those outside imperial space, could be 
conducted in recognisably colonial ways.40 Malcolm was asked to build connections with 
intermediaries, identify potential contractors, conduct further trials, make every effort to 
inspect the mines himself, and – expecting resistance – to call on the British minster for 
                                                          
38 Although not for Gun Boats, whose furnaces would likely become choked with ash: C. Shadwell to J. Hope, 
17 Oct. 1859, ADM 125/115. 
39 J. Hope to Lt. Malcolm, encl. in J. Hope despatch of 22 Dec. 1859, ADM 125/115. 
40 For more on the Admiralty as ‘a late nineteenth-century contractor state’, see: Gray, Steam Power.  
support. Despite Alcock’s help, Malcolm never made it to the mines, and Hope backed down 
from confrontation on this point, judging it ‘inexpedient’.41 Still, Malcolm pressed on, testing 
Hirado coal (‘a good lively coal and promises much’) on a mission his Commander 
maintained would ‘greatly facilitate the operations to the North’. By February 1860 he was 
back in Shanghai sharing new information about Japanese mining techniques and the coal 
trade. The Japanese were jealous of their minerals, Malcolm wrote, and looked upon them ‘as 
on the bones of a body without which the body cannot exist’; but he believed their reluctance 
to sell could be overcome.42  
The following month saw Malcolm’s return to Nagasaki, this time to erect a naval 
coal depot of 10,000 tons. It was a fraught process, involving much negotiation ‘under 
circumstances of considerable difficulty’, but it was done: by December, 1860, the depot had 
delivered 9,685 tons of coal to twelve British transports and five warships, with a further 
3,000 tons held in storage. Hope was left in no doubt of its contribution to the success of the 
China campaign. The expedition’s steamers had required 13,000 tons of coal, Hong Kong had 
had just 2,000 tons in store, and the squadron could not have gone north – atoning for defeat 
on the Peiho the previous year – without turning to Japan ‘for such supplies as could be 
obtained there’.43  
 Admiral Hope’s military use of Japanese coal – ‘no matter has been the subject of 
more anxious consideration by me’ – was far from the only way in which the growth of 
British influence in northern China and Japan were connected. Linguistic and institutional 
imperatives may have worked work to keep historical studies of China and Japan apart, but 
an imperial history approach underscores their interconnections in this period. Shanghai and 
Yokohama formed a particular axis. With pebrine disease still crippling silk production in 
                                                          
41 J. Hope to R. Alcock, 8 Mar. 1860, ADM 125/115.  
42 Malcolm, report of 24 Feb. 1860, ADM 125/115.  
43 C. Templar to J. Hope, [n.d.] Oct. 1860, and J. Hope to C. Paget, no. 233, 9 July 1860, ADM 125/115.  
Europe, and with ongoing concerns about supply in a China ravaged by civil war, Yokohama 
gave Shanghai merchants fresh cause for commercial optimism ‘despite the danger, fraud and 
cheating’ they encountered there.44 Shanghai, in turn, sent forth the capital, expertise and 
shipping on which exploratory trades relied.45 Growing confidence in navigating the Inland 
Sea (Setonaikai), in particular, spared merchant vessels the most risky stage of the passage to 
and from the north China coast, and accelerated the ports’ interconnection from the winter of 
1859-60.46 Shanghai’s North China Herald keenly covered developments in the ‘opening’ of 
Japan, anticipating the opportunities should its government ‘be either coaxed, or frightened 
out of their present timid policy’.47 The paper covered mercantile prospects and official 
tensions at Yokohama in detail in the early 1860s. Any account of Shanghai’s fortunes would 
be incomplete, it wrote in review of the year 1859, ‘were we to omit mention of Japan, of 
which our port is the nearest neighbour, and so far the natural organ …’.48 So strong were the 
links between the two that they altered the geography of the China trade itself, transforming 
Shanghai from the last in the line of the China treaty ports ‘to the epicentre of a regional 
trading network’.49  
 Tracing the careers of the British merchants of Shanghai and Yokohama further points 
to the latter’s implication in the identities, outlooks and practices of the British world system. 
Most foreign merchants in bakumatsu Japan had cut their teeth on the China coast, including 
Kenneth Ross Mackenzie (of Shanghai’s Mackenzie Bros. & Co.), William Gregson Aspinall 
(co-founder of Aspinall, Cornes and Co. of Kōbe and Yokohama), and the very victim of the 
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Namamugi Incident himself, Charles Lenox Richardson, who had traded tea and silk at 
Shanghai since 1853, and who, it seems likely, was pondering a move to Japan.50 British 
officials, too, brought with them the characteristics and expectations they had developed on 
prior postings, and understood Japan as occupying a position comparable to other sites 
around Britain’s informal empire. Alcock, for example, explained his uncompromising stance 
towards the Japanese authorities in terms of his ‘years of unvarying experience among a 
kindred race of officials’ in China (and which itself was modelled on ‘the usage and custom 
of Europe in relations with the Barbary States and others of the Levant’).51 Like many, he 
believed that British influence in Japan would rise and fall with the fate of its armed forces in 
China, and lost no time in informing the bakufu when a fresh fleet was on its way out from 
England ‘to exact redress and enforce the execution of the Treaties’.52  
Two final factors concerning Japan’s implication in British expansion flowed from 
the strength of the Shanghai-Yokohama axis. The first is that Shanghai’s merchants did not 
merely carry over their capital and expertise, but also their assumptions: about Oriental 
duplicity, mendacity and cowardice (all much more pronounced in the treaty port press than 
in British descriptions of Japan at home); and about the role of force in supporting private 
commerce on the frontiers of British influence, informed by experience of the most recent 
Opium War. As the Yokohama trade failed to reached the optimistic projections of its early 
foreign residents (unlike Shanghai, there had been no great success stories, most merchants 
merely making enough to cover their rent, food, firearms and alcohol), they soon began to 
complain of their ‘confinement’ within settlement limits and of the timidity of Britain’s 
representatives. When, in 1862, Britain’s new chargé d’affaires announced that London had 
agreed to Japanese requests to delay the promised opening of key ports, many feared it would 
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spell their ‘perpetual exclusion’ from the country’s greatest commercial prospects. In their 
eyes, it offered proof of the bakufu’s contempt for Britain’s apparent timidity; only ‘when 
they begin to think us less amiable we shall begin to find them more faithful’. The Yokohama 
merchants now wrote openly of the need for some kind of crisis to transform their position – 
‘some Harry Parkes [to] get our political relations into confusion; some Admiral Seymour 
[to] stir them up with shot and shell’ – if only circumstances would allow.53 
The second feature exacerbated by that strong Shanghai-Yokohama connection was 
London’s tendency to view Japan as merely an extension of its wider China system. 
Normally, this worked to militate against precisely the type of intervention that the 
Yokohama merchants desired. China was so clearly the more important market; why risk it 
over the tribulations of British merchants in Japan? (Some British observers had even 
cautioned against ‘opening’ Japan at all, lest a rebuff have repercussions for Britain’s position 
in China).54 But the connection went both ways. If London could be convinced that a crisis at 
Yokohama carried implications for the wider China system – if it came to believe that a climb 
down risked undermining something larger – then its reluctance to intervene might just be 
overcome. This was the context in which the Richardson party, setting out on an excursion 
from Yokohama, came upon a quiet place called Namamugi. 
 
 
‘The Blazon of Our Wrath’ 
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Bridgeheads, in Darwin’s formulation, took all manner of forms. They could vary in size 
from ‘a decaying factory on a torrid coast’ to the swagger and dominion of John Company 
itself. Everywhere, however, ‘whether British influence grew, or was transformed into formal 
or informal empire, largely depended upon the circumstances and performance of the 
bridgehead’. In sketching the factors involved – a bridgehead’s ability to navigate its ‘host 
environment’, or attract metropolitan attention and resources, or simply endure the vagaries 
of British parliamentary democracy – Darwin contributed to our progressive reimagination of 
Britain’s empire as a networked entity, constituted by a variety of flows of people, objects, 
and ideas.55  
 Because bridgeheads could fail as well as succeed, the concept encourages us to keep 
an eye open for imperial dynamics in unusual places; for the aspirations and frustrations of 
unrealised expansion; for sites where empire met its match. Darwin approached colonial wars 
with a similar interest in the contingency, confusion and messiness behind their outbreak, 
noting the importance of prevailing assumptions, information and its interlocutors, and of 
where effective decisions were actually made in determining the use of organized violence.56 
Such an approach has much to offer our understanding of the bombardment of Kagoshima – 
an event seldom on the radar of historians of empire, on the one hand, and explained away as 
straightforward ‘gunboat diplomacy’ by historians of Japan, on the other. In truth, a variety of 
peculiar conditions had to come into alignment for the death of a merchant to be translated 
into naval action. After all, Richardson’s murder was by no means the first to have occurred 
in the young foreign settlement at Yokohama. ‘There are seven foreign graves on the bluff of 
Treaty Point’, an American merchant recorded in 1860. ‘Six of the occupants died violent 
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deaths, five out of the six having been assassinated in the streets’ – so the logic of civis 
Romanus sum is clearly insufficient to explain why the bombardment took place.57  
The answer would seem to lie with the active lobbying of the foreign merchant 
community here, and their success in temporarily turning a local incident into an ‘outrage’ 
that warranted armed intervention to protect and extend their activities. In the days after 
Richardson’s funeral, the Japan Herald - the leading voice of the foreign community - was in 
no doubt about the course the British Government should follow. ‘Let his tomb be the blazon 
of our wrath to come’, it thundered, ‘the stern remembrancer of our just revenge’.58 Securing 
that outcome, however, would involve playing a weak hand well. As a bridgehead for 
imperial intervention, the Yokohama of the early 1860s laboured under a number of 
disadvantages. As W.G. Beasley demonstrated long ago, there never emerged a coherent, 
interventionist mercantile lobby for Japan and its waters to rival that of the ‘old China 
hands’.59 British merchants felt the home government knew and cared little about the country, 
especially when compared with the greater commercial prospect of China: ‘what is fatal to us 
here’, one resident wrote home, ‘is the generally believed unimportance of Japan’.60 What 
little was known was not necessarily helpful, either. In 1861 The Edinburgh Review criticised 
a stream of ‘superficial’ publications on Japan for misleading a ‘credulous public’ into 
thinking ‘the triumph of European civilization in Japan’ was ‘already secure’.61 Foreign 
merchants in Yokohama felt the tyranny of distance, too: the mail to London could take two 
and a half months, and getting traction in the London press was often dependent on getting a 
sympathetic hearing from Hong Kong or Shanghai first.  
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Richardson’s murder, however, came at a critical moment for foreign trade in Japan, 
and British merchants seized this chance to shock London into action – perhaps even into a 
more general defence of British interests in Japan – even as it deepened the rift between them 
and their diplomatic representatives. As word of the attack came in, parties of merchants 
rushed out along the Tōkaidō in the hope of intercepting the attackers themselves. They were 
joined by the British Consul, Francis Howard Vyse, and by the French Minister, Gustave de 
Bellecourt. But all of them set out in defiance of instructions from Vyse’s superior, the 
British charge d’affaires, Colonel Neale, who struggled in vain to order the foreign residents 
to remain in the settlement. Even the British consular guard were swept up in the moment, 
setting out on the Tōkaidō and refusing Neale’s calls to return to Yokohama. Essentially, at 
this moment of crisis, Neale’s authority over his subordinates had slipped away, and the 
Yokohama merchant community seized the initiative. 
Having found Richardson’s body found at the roadside, the merchants returned to the 
settlement and held meetings throughout the night. They vented their frustration at Neale’s 
timid response; set down their lack of confidence in his leadership in a direct appeal to 
London; and pointedly contrasted his apparent inaction – even cowardice – with that of Vyse 
and Bellecourt. The next morning, at another emergency meeting, Neale eventually 
succeeded in talking the merchants down from effecting immediate reprisals (though not 
‘without occurring obloquy’, as he somewhat diffidently informed the Foreign Secretary), 
and promised to seek fresh instructions from London.62 But the race was now on to control 
the narrative – disputed accounts of what had transpired, and what had been said, began to 
circulate – and to convince London to take their side in this dispute. Reading through Lord 
John Russell’s papers, it is clear that he found the merchants’ barbs contrasting praise for the 
French Minister’s boldness with contempt for their own man’s timidity particularly galling. 
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Permission to call on the China squadron was granted, at least in part, to recapture the 
initiative from an increasingly belligerent merchant community. 
Immediately after Richardson’s funeral, Yokohama’s foreign merchants assembled 
and approved a motion from the agent for Jardine, Matheson & Company (who days before 
had been urging Vyse to do more to defend British trade) to issue an extra to the Japan 
Herald carrying their collective written statement, and to get this into circulation along the 
China coast.63 As Todd Munson has written, Yokohama’s foreign community ‘arrogated to 
itself an unprecedented degree of press freedom in the 1860s, making it perhaps the most 
open and eclectic publishing locale in Asia’, and the instinct to prepare pamphlets, articles 
and correspondence formed a significant part of their immediate response to the crisis.64 The 
merchants elected a delegation to restate, in the Herald, their criticism of Neale’s behaviour; 
for his part, Neale attempted to quash the stubborn rumour that he had twice ordered the 
consular guard’s recall.65 The delegation also prepared a new preface to their direct address to 
the Foreign Secretary, insisting that Neale’s inaction had made this ‘unusual step’ necessary, 
and urging upon him ‘the general opinion amongst the foreign officials and naval authorities, 
as well as the mercantile community … [that] a severe lesson inflicted on the spot would 
have been the best means of preventing a recurrence of a similar crime’. (‘Directly opposed 
to the facts’, Neale added in the margin.)66 Days later The Japan Express, a more fitful 
publication, made one of its few surviving forays into print to demand an armed response: 
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“What course will England pursue?” is on the mind of every one. England has but 
one course open to her … Punish the Daimios whose retainers have spilled English 
Blood. They are known!!!, and can be reached.67 
 
Across 1863 the Herald kept Richardson’s name alive, pushing for a showdown, making the 
idea of armed intervention ever more conceivable, and anxiously monitoring how the issue 
played out in the home and China press. By the summer the paper congratulated itself upon 
the attention the Yokohama community had lately received in the British press – even if it 
still had cause to resent the tone of some of the coverage.68  
An active treaty port press was one thing, but, as Darwin observed, getting traction 
could also depend on the skill and connections of a ‘second bridgehead’ at the domestic end 
of the imperial axis. In this, the advocates of intervention were, in part, simply lucky; lucky 
that Rutherford Alcock – Britain’s first Consul-General in Japan, and a trusted diviner of 
Japanese events – happened to be in London, on extended medical leave, as word of the 
attack came in. Through Alcock, the tyranny of distance that had so often kept Japan out of 
mind in London was temporarily bridged; and while he was normally no friend of the 
Yokohama merchants, on this occasion he was on hand to share their indignation, echo their 
views of the wider interests at stake, and to meet personally with the Foreign Secretary and 
urge a forceful response. Richardson’s murder, Alcock told Russell, was ‘of a character more 
openly defiant’ than any which had come before, and called ‘for a corresponding energy in 
the demand for justice and redress’. ‘There is a contagion in such examples’, he warned. 
Coming as it did so soon after British diplomatic concessions, it would not fail to embolden 
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those intent on ‘pen[ning] us up as the Dutch of old, in one or more [Dejimas]’.69 Raising the 
twin spectres of Dejima and Canton – synonyms for the humiliation of European power in 
Asia – was a particularly powerful line that featured prominently in the debates that 
followed.70  
There was also something in the circumstances of the murder that helped mark it out 
as ‘the most atrocious’ of the attacks yet experienced by Japan’s foreign residents.71 It had 
happened, shockingly, ‘in the open day, upon the broad high road, before more than 200 
witnesses’ – including European survivors. Unlike past attacks it was not, apparently, the 
work of an isolated zealot, but had occurred ‘in the presence of one of the magnates of the 
land’, raising hopes that someone might finally be brought to book.72 The fact that an English 
woman had been in the party also made this a ‘special outrage’, with some of the coverage 
echoing narratives of chivalry and feminine victimhood familiar to scholars of the Indian 
‘Mutiny’.73 Beyond these circumstances, Richardson’s murder had occurred amidst a feeling 
– as widespread as it was vague – that Japan stood at a crossroads, its future orientation and 
prospects teetering in the balance, ‘a lurid star of the first magnitude’.74 Critics of the Opium 
Wars still hoped that British intercourse with Japan may yet flourish without repeating the 
bloody mistakes that marred its record in China, so that the Government’s response took on a 
wider significance.75 All this was amplified by the heightened interest in foreign affairs that 
characterised British politics in the 1860s.76 As Yokoyama Toshio has observed, the early 
                                                          
69 R. Alcock to J. Russell, 29 Nov. 1862, FO 46/25.  
70 For example: G.S. Morrison, Our Position and Policy in Japan (Brighton, 1863).  
71 R. Alcock to J. Russell, 29 Nov. 1862, and encl. R. Alcock, ‘Memorandum on Admiral Hope’s despatch to 
the Admiralty in reference to Japanese Affairs’, FO 46/25.  
72 JH 44, 20 Sept. 1862, 173; see also: JH 45, 27 Sept. 1862, 179. Foreign magistrate Mizuno Tadanori agreed 
that the failure to bring assassins to justice was ‘particularly reprehensible in the case of the Namamugi affair, 
for although it took place before the eyes of the lord himself, his retainers have been allowed to escape’: T. 
Mizuno to M. Inoue, 20 April 1863, cited in Beasley, Select Documents, 240-241. 
73 Blunt, “Embodying War”; Paxton, “Mobilizing Chivalry”. 
74 NCH 625, 19 July 1862, 114, republished in: JH 38, 9 Aug. 1862.  
75 ‘The State of Our Relations with Japan’, The Herald of Peace 157, 1 July 1863, 217-219.  
76 Howe, “Free Trade”, 35.  
1860s did not merely witness a sea change in British depictions of Japan; because of its 
remoteness ‘Japan became a country which…authors felt free to use for any kind of 
argument’.77  
In positing the bridgehead concept, Darwin called for closer attention to the 
‘information milieu’ of British expansion – the forms and means by which information from 
the periphery ‘was gathered, processed and disseminated at home’. In Japan, British officials 
admitted their difficulties in understanding Japanese factions, distinguishing Japanese 
personalities, and in making any sense of a tumultuous political environment.78 But in the 
absence of consistent, coherent political analysis, the importance of how fragmentary 
information was packaged and presented grew, so that the fug of confusion that surrounded 
Britain’s Japan policy presented the merchants with a chance to influence events. 
A number of sets of images seem to have really cut through to shape the decision to 
approve military action, impressions formed in the treaty port press and echoed in official and 
private papers that winter. One was the image of Richardson as a martyr for the cause of free 
trade. This was vital to the merchants’ bid to conflate Britain’s response to his death with 
their own demands for ever greater commercial access. The idea spread alongside a carefully 
curated image of Richardson himself as a ‘fine and manly specimen of a young Englishman’, 
whose ‘gentle manner and chivalrous disposition, were concealed under a quiet exterior’: a 
laudatory assessment that would only later be challenged.79 Men like Richardson, the Japan 
Herald insisted, had ‘responded to the call’ and ‘come here as “pioneers of trade and 
civilization”’; it fell to the British Government to ensure they were not abandoned to 
assassination ‘or driven out by threats until our trade is annihilated and our prestige 
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destroyed’.80 These were powerful images to deploy in the 1860s in Britain, where a vague 
awareness of the persecution of Christians and of the exclusion of foreigners made up much 
of what was known of Japan, and where the ideology of Free Trade ran at its peak. By the 
start of 1863 the Yokohama merchants had become adept at equating their restlessness with 
the march of progress, while depicting Neale as a brake on deeper access. Crucially, the habit 
of connecting Richardson’s murder with the survival of foreign trade had become 
widespread, his killing read in terms of a premeditated campaign to grind the commercial 
treaties out of existence.81  
Framing Richardson’s murder in this way greatly increased its impact in Britain. It 
created a simple framework through which those with no knowledge of Japan could imagine 
the stakes and empathise with the merchants. As Russell put it neatly, if crudely, the Japanese 
‘appear from a distance to be divided into free traders and protectionist parties, as we have 
been at home’.82 It also helped to overcome more positive impressions of Japan and the 
bakufu, either emanating from more optimistic voices (such as the American Consul, George 
Fisher) or belonging to an earlier wave of Japan literature in Britain.83  
A second set of images concerned Japan’s seaways, highways and entrepôts. We 
might refer to these as the imagined geographies of intervention, for they helped 
policymakers quite unfamiliar with Japan to imagine what was at stake, and what Britain 
might do about it. First, editorials drew knowingly on the spatial imaginary of ‘confinement’ 
to the coast – that powerful motif of the Opium Wars. As Hong Kong’s China Mail put it in 
January 1863, ‘it is only too well known that our liberties and privileges in Japan have been 
gradually curtailed, until they have reached those narrow limits by which we are virtually 
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confined to a spot of earth …’.84 It was particularly effective, with British influence, 
commerce and civilisation being ‘imprisoned’ within ‘narrow’ and ‘vulnerable’ enclaves; 
even those hostile to the merchants’ demands found themselves using this language.85  
Another image floating before policy-makers’ minds was of the high road, the 
Tōkaidō; not as an artery for greater western commerce (foreign residents really only used it 
for leisure) but as a gauntlet for national prestige. Again, historians of the Opium Wars have 
shown the importance of issues of dignity, honour and pride in understanding how colonial 
conflicts escalated; not least their role in crystallising a sense of what was at stake for a 
Cabinet for whom East Asian affairs were at most of intermittent interest.86 In bakumatsu 
Japan, these issues were intimately bound up with the idea of The Road. John Reddie Black, 
the first editor of the Japan Herald, recalled the emotive power of ‘the far-famed Tokaido’ in 
the eyes of the Yokohama merchants, and its place within their demands for ever greater 
levels of access. Exploring the high road ‘was something to talk about as a kind of feat of 
daring’, Black remembered, ‘deserving of being described to all one’s friends as something 
very heroic and wonderful’.87  Accounts of trips and of incidents on the road filled the pages 
of the settlement press and featured often in consular despatches. It was by exploring the road 
that the merchant community contrasted their position with that of the ignominious 
confinement of the Dutch at Dejima, with parties insisting on their right to roam within treaty 
limits, relating near-misses with daimio processions, and loudly demanding an extension of 
the range of excursions permitted. By the time of the Namamugi incident, foreigners’ use of 
the Tōkaidō had become a portentous symbol of status, an activity so charged with potential 
for insult and slight that it was bound to generate conflict sooner or later. In the weeks and 
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months following Richardson’s death, foreign merchants defiantly set out along the high road 
to, in the Herald’s words, ‘exercise our liberty’; Neale’s repeated attempts to discourage this 
behaviour were among the foremost complaints lodged against him.88  
A third imagined geography of intervention concerned the idea that the archipelagic 
nature of Japan made its leading daimiyo particularly vulnerable to even a limited application 
of naval force. This idea seems to have taken hold over the spring of 1863, temporarily 
overturning long-standing reservations about the difficulties of fighting in Japan. ‘No daimio 
is more accessible for redress than this prince’, wrote one merchant about Shimazu 
Hisamitsu, noting his city by the bay, his shipping concerns, and his interests along the 
Ryūkyū island chain.89 These views were shortly being echoed in official, naval and private 
correspondence: Satsuma’s territories ‘lie within our grasp’, urged Alcock, ‘and are 
peculiarly exposed to attack from the sea…’.90  Satsuma’s true relationship with the 
Shogunate may have been a mystery to the British; its attitude towards foreign trade was 
widely misunderstood; but a growing belief that a naval demonstration here would be both 
cheap and effective helped to favour that course of action nonetheless. Within a week of news 
of the Namamugi affair reaching London, the First Lord of the Admiralty was writing to Lord 
John Russell with ‘information…of use in considering how we should act ... I have now a 
chart of the Japanese islands, on which the properties of several principal Daimios are 
marked. They can be attacked by ships and gun-boats’.91 This was music to Palmerston’s 
ears. ‘If their residences are approachable to … our ships’, he wrote privately to his Foreign 
Secretary, ‘or if they have an interest in Ports which can be blockaded or knocked about their 
ears without disturbing our ports of commerce, an example or two of just retribution would 
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go far to teach these Gentlemen better conduct’.92 Ultimately, this reading of Satsuma’s acute 
maritime vulnerability led to overconfidence: the British would be surprised by the damage 
they themselves sustained at Kagoshima.  
And so, while the Prime Minister may ordinarily have shown no particular interest in 
Japan, he could quickly recognise the contours of this crisis. Richardson’s death presented 
such a neat image that it cut through the fug: abstract issues of national prestige and the 
course of free trade were embodied in the aborted progress of one man along a country road. 
Threats of and recourse to blockade and bombardment, he wrote to Russell that December, 
were ‘the true [method] for putting an end to these atrocities’. Daimyō residences ‘should 
share the fate of the Summer Palace in China’.93 Within a month, fresh instructions were on 
their way to Neale in Yokohama. While they approved of his caution in the immediate 
aftermath of the killing, and censured Vyse for his flagrant insubordination, they also 
contained an implicit warning: some form of resolute action, backed up by the threat of force, 
would now be required to keep on the front foot. Vyse’s conduct may have been wayward, 
but London could ‘perfectly understand the feelings of indignation and alarm’ which had 
spread through the merchant community: Neale must demand reparations from the bakufu 
and Satsuma alike and, if necessary to secure them, call on the navy to take such measures ‘of 
reprisal or blockade, or of both’.94  
To re-establish Neale’s authority in the merchants’ eyes, he was explicitly given 
ownership of the new policy. He would need to act decisively to prevent the community’s 
fearful agitation from boiling over once again. Ultimately, any understanding of how the 
bombardment of Kagoshima came to pass must take into account the fragile authority of 
Britain’s man-on-the-spot, and the tremendous strain upon him. The midnight meetings of 
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September 1862, six subsequent months of merchant pressure, and London’s concern about 
their official’s local legitimacy combined to greatly increase the odds of military action. The 
Japan Express had not hesitated to claim that had another official been in Neale’s position 
‘the result would have been very different’, and that Neale’s failure to demonstrate greater 
‘Pluck’ or ‘Humanity’ had ‘endangered the life of every foreigner in the Settlement’.95 Once 
negotiations began, the repeated cycle of deadlines set and missed worked to ramp up the 
tension again and again. The Herald, reprinting criticisms from the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
papers, repeatedly suggested that Neale’s caution and timidity made him unfit for his post, 
and that he ought to be recalled.96 Periodicals in Britain and the treaty ports dared him to act 
with thinly-veiled accusations of cowardice; there were calls for an enquiry into his conduct. 
‘The never-ceasing fatigue, anxiety and overpowering responsibility to which I have [been] 
subjected from the day of my arrival in this country’, Neale later told Russell, ‘has weighed 
heavily on my health and spirit’.97 He felt the sting of the merchants’ embrace of his French 
counterpart particularly keenly, and a year later was still complaining bitterly of the 
embarrassment this had caused him.98 Cloistered away in this tightly-packed community, it 
was perhaps inevitable that the pressure would begin to tell. It was only with the order to 
make sail for Kagoshima – and among first reports of its apparent destruction – that Neale’s 
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A Bridgehead Too Far 
 
 
The term ‘gunboat diplomacy’ can obscure as much as it reveals. Sometimes it stands in the 
way of more serious investigation of the complex dynamics of expansion. It can also imply 
that a particular colonial conflict was more one-sided than it really was. Both shortcomings 
have affected our readings of what happened at Kagoshima in the August of 1863. For two 
days the British squadron under Rear Admiral Augustus Kuper bombarded the principal port 
of the Satsuma domain, and while it succeeded in damaging a large portion of the town, it did 
not feel much like victory. The squadron was caught off guard when Satsuma’s batteries 
opened fire first, in an exchange so intense that old hands likened it to the siege of 
Sebastopol. One ship was forced to slip her cable, another ran aground, while aboard the 
flagship the Captain and Commander were killed on the bridge by the same shot. By the time 
the squadron was in position a typhoon was raging in the bay, snapping spars, forcing ships 
out of line, and bringing on an early dusk that forced the squadron to suspend operations. By 
the end of the second day the British had sustained sixty casualties, half in the flagship 
Euryalus (hulled ten times, her rigging ‘cut to pieces’), so that readers were troubled to learn 
of the deadly work done by Satsuma’s ‘splendid artillerists’.99 The squadron departed without 
attempting a landing – let alone securing the arrest of Richardson’s assassins, as had been 
hoped. ‘We came away’, one shipboard observer wrote, ‘for the most part in a great state of 
discontent; nearly everyone wanted to go in again the next day, instead of leaving…’.100  
 The bombardment of Kagoshima would represent the high water mark of the lobbying 
of Yokohama merchants for intervention. Yet while London waited to hear the outcome of its 
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demands, and again as it digested reports from Kagoshima, there was widespread 
contemplation of the possibility of a wider war with Japan, and perhaps even occupation of 
part of the country. Seasoned Japan observers had long suspected that violence might prove 
necessary before foreign trade could really take root here.101 The liberal Huddersfield 
Chronicle was unusual in giving thanks for Neale’s initial caution, but nonetheless suspected 
that a state of war might not lie very far off.102 That fight would neither be quick nor easy. 
The Japanese were ‘as warlike as the people of the Punjab’, and war with them ‘a far more 
formidable affair than any of our wars in China, perhaps more than our wars in India.’103 In 
Japan both foreign and Japanese authorities issued proclamations that showed just how far 
they expected things to escalate; the latter requisitioned private boats and began evacuating 
its subjects from coastal areas.104 For Palmerston, bombarding Kagoshima sat neatly within a 
general scheme of ‘the usual and unavoidable stages of the intercourse of strong and civilized 
nations with weaker and less civilized ones’ which, to his mind, had already played out in 
China: treaties were drawn up, faith was breached, and violence ensued until the ‘successful 
display of superior strength’.105 Indeed, both advocates and critics of intervention in Japan 
gave that intervention a place along a spectrum of recognisably imperial activity. In London, 
Frederic Harrison predicted that Britain would now be dragged along a haphazard course of 
occupying territory across the Japanese archipelago, ‘“temporarily” of course at first … to 
sustain the very authority which we have violently destroyed’.106 
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These warnings sound outlandish now, but they were not unfounded. During the 
eleven month interval between Richardson’s murder and the clash at Kagoshima the 
Admiralty, consular officials and the press raised a number of such possibilities. Initially, 
attention focused again on those ‘Loochoo Islands’, the Ryūkyūs, where unofficial designs 
for greater imperial influence had been floated since the 1840s. Now, as the British 
considered ways to put pressure on Satsuma, the extent of that domain’s authority over those 
Islands was finally made plain, raising once more the question of some form of British 
intervention.107 For the Japan Herald, now was the time to eject Satsuma from Ryūkyū 
altogether, to oversee ‘the separation of Loochoo from Japan’, to appoint a Resident to advise 
its King, and to make Naha ‘a free trade port’. The advantages to foreign trade were obvious 
and would radiate out across the North Pacific, just as Hong Kong had proved ‘the fulcrum 
on which the lever has rested which is opening up China’.108 Nor was this the only 
annexationist idea doing the rounds. Rutherford Alcock discussed the possibility of 
temporarily occupying Nagasaki. The consul at Nagasaki, Charles Winchester, proposed 
occupying an Inland Sea island, perhaps Awaji-shima. The Admiralty, meanwhile, noted the 
advantages that would accrue from a tighter British hold over the Bonins.109 Nothing came of 
these visions, but they are important nonetheless. For a time, the Japanese archipelago held 
out the prospect – at least to some interested Britons – of potential points d’appui; its islands 
and its coastline a springboard for the further projection of British commerce and power.  
These visions remind us of Japan’s place in wider discussions of British imperialism 
in maritime Asia. Arguably, they were as close as Britain – or any of the foreign powers – 
would come to sidestepping the treaty system and imposing force on bakumatsu Japan. And 
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yet armed intervention did not result in territorial expansion. The framework of relations 
established by the Ansei treaties survived, and understanding why this was so offers an 
insight into the [drivers] and [constraints] underpinning British expansion as a whole.110  
In this case, the relative performance of British and Japanese arms mattered, as word 
of Kagoshima served to check momentum for further operations. News of the squadron had 
been keenly anticipated, but if this was indeed ‘a fair test of what foreign fleets can do, 
should the war become more general’, then the results were not encouraging.111 To have left 
with such high casualties, and without effecting a landing, allowed those on shore to rightly 
celebrate ‘that the English ships did not succeed in coming and that they were swept out and 
chased away…’.112 The best that The Overland China Mail could say of the engagement was 
that it was ‘wonderfully indecisive’, and it was precisely that indecision which now stoked 
debate in London about the whole course of action.113 The bombardment was also seen as 
offering a trial of the Royal Navy’s new, heavier, breech-loading Armstrong guns, but even 
these disappointed: reports of their unreliability at Kagoshima would see the navy revert to 
muzzle-loaders for years to come.114  
Kuper, for his part, seems to have been unsure how to proceed. Upon the squadron’s 
return to Yokohama, he reported soberly on the daunting prospect of more ‘extensive 
operations’ against other anti-foreign ‘princes’ in Japan.115 The British authorities at 
Yokohama were thus taken by surprise when, some three months later, envoys from Satsuma 
unexpectedly arrived and announced their willingness to talk. Ultimately, the British agreed 
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to terms that fell a little short of their initial demands, to the ire of many in the Yokohama 
foreign settlement.116 
By then, the drama had shifted from Yokohama to London, where news of the 
bombardment arrived in late October 1863. In the context of the navy’s setbacks, the 
weaknesses of the Yokohama bridgehead now reasserted themselves, and other voices – ones 
better placed to bring wider angles of vision onto the case – returned to drown it out. Just as 
the outrage over Richardson’s death had been amplified by the confusion that surrounded 
British readings of Japan, it now was the turn of fresh misunderstandings – about the scale of 
destruction apparently wrought upon Kagoshima – to engender feelings of outrage from the 
other side of the aisle. Rumours began to circulate – quite erroneous – that the entire city had 
been levelled, and thousands killed; and in Parliament, in the press, and in meetings around 
the country, the bombardment of Kagoshima became the issue of the day. Alcock quickly 
perceived the scope for controversy. ‘Many questions will arise in the Public mind’, he 
advised Lord Russell that November, ‘…and be more or less anxiously discussed, as the 
certainty of another Eastern complication, and the possibility of a protracted war are 
realized’.117 He was right, for while Kagoshima did prompt letters and petitions from 
Congregationalists, Baptists, the Peace Society and Richard Cobden (who hoped it might 
mark ‘the turning point in our Eastern policy’), the backlash went deeper and wider than 
these usual suspects.118 ‘The whole transaction’, the Liberal MP Justin McCarthy 
remembered, ‘was severely condemned by many Englishmen who did not belong to the ranks 
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of those professed philanthropists whom it is sometimes the fashion to denounce …’.119 The 
Times reported the bombardment coming up ‘at most meetings between members of 
Parliament and their constituents’, and gave space to relate some of the most interesting 
exchanges.120 In that respect, and as a political debate that was simultaneously about British 
rights and ‘freedoms’ and the morality of policy, Kagoshima warrants consideration 
alongside some of the great debates of the age: a successor to the Don Pacifico Affair of 
1850; a forerunner to Jamaica and the Governor Eyre controversy of 1865.121 
While much has been written on the impact of the bombardment on Satsuma and on 
Japanese politics, its fallout in Britain seldom receives the attention deserves. Read critically, 
however, it helps plot the headwind against which the case for sustained intervention here 
had struggled. At first, it was the perceived ferocity of the bombardment itself that set the 
protest in motion.122 Critics read with horror Kuper’s own verdict that ‘the entire town of 
Kagosima is now a mass of ruins’.123 And while there were, at first, no further accounts with 
which to corroborate his claim, the stubborn idea took hold that thousands of innocents must 
have perished in the bombardment – all to avenge the death of one Englishman. As Colonel 
Neale was later forced to explain, Kagoshima’s population was in fact smaller than most 
supposed, and almost all its inhabitants had been ordered out of the city by the authorities 
before the first shot was fired.124 There was also some sleight of hand in the most ardent of 
these critiques, for they tended to gloss over the strength of Satsuma’s resistance. But the 
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misunderstanding over the casualty figures was in all probability quite genuine, driven by a 
mix of ignorance, outrage and inference (the number of Japanese directly killed by British 
action may even have been in single figures). Either way, the notion that Neale and Kuper 
had ‘committed wholescale massacre in revenge for an attack on three British traders’ proved 
hard to shift. It was still to be found in some accounts from the early twentieth century.125  
 For some, the precise figure was by the by: it was the nature of Kuper’s firing on the 
town that had brought shame upon the action.126 Kuper maintained that he had sailed to 
Kagoshima ‘with pacific intentions’; his defenders (including, naturally, the Japan Herald) 
denounced Cobden and his ilk for seeking ‘to excite the indignation of the British public 
against…gallant officers…for acting up to their unmistakeable duty’.127 But he had also been 
heard, before the bombardment, telling Satsuma’s envoys that the city lay at his mercy, and 
would be destroyed unless they submitted.128 Either way, it was hard to overlook the fact that 
Kuper had continued his bombardment even after it became clear that his shells had fired the 
city. For some, this became the true ‘outrage’ of the Richardson affair: ‘an act of barbarity 
unworthy of the civilization of our era’; ‘the most wanton and shameless outrage which has 
stained the English name for years’.129 The New York Times thought Kuper’s conduct even 
more heinous than ‘the blowing of Hindoo rebels from British cannon’ during the Indian 
‘Mutiny’.130 For others, the bombardment had exposed to the world the extent of Britain’s 
hypocrisy, for while the government ‘roar[s] like a lion in the Southern or Eastern seas’ 
against forces ‘utterly incommensurate with ours’, it had felt ‘all the tenderness of [its] lamb-
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like bleating’ against opponents of equal strength. In the context of recent humiliations in 
British foreign policy in Europe, backing down from collisions with Prussia (over Denmark) 
and Russia (over Poland), it seemed clear that ‘the arrogant patrons of the Civis Romanus will 
only defend him against safe antagonists’ – more echoes of the Don Pacifico affair. Thus had 
British policy been reduced to ‘bullying the weak and truckling to the strong … a portentous 
mixture of bounce and baseness’.131 
As criticism of the navy’s conduct at Kagoshima mounted, international acquiescence 
in Britain’s unilateral intervention also began to break down. That united front had helped 
enable action in the first place. The French Minister Bellecourt, as we have seen, was just as 
keen as the merchants to see Satsuma humiliated and European prestige restored, while it was 
the French Admiral Jaures’ undertaking to protect Yokohama in the absence of Kuper’s 
squadron that freed the Royal Navy to sail for Kagoshima. (American diplomats in Japan 
were more guarded in their support, but frankly admitted their diminished authority in light of 
the spectacle of their own Civil War.)132 The reported scale of destruction at Kagoshima 
played badly, however, as newspapers in France and the United States seized the opportunity 
to paint Britain as a bully and to descry ‘British barbarity’ – much to the chagrin of Robert 
Gascoyne-Cecil, the future Lord Salisbury.133 Such criticism made its way back into British 
politics: in proposing a fresh debate on the bombardment in Parliament, the MP Charles 
Buxton hoped ‘that the character of England for humanity [would] be vindicated’, for ‘it has 
suffered severely in the eyes of foreigners from this act’.134 When the Government’s demands 
arrived in Japan, it was even reported that the Russian and American representatives had 
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offered the bakufu ‘moral and material support’ should they stand their ground. That rumour 
could never be proven, but it nonetheless gave pause to some erstwhile advocates of a 
forceful policy towards Japan, lest further intervention ‘[add] a European quarrel to an 
Asiatic difficulty’.135  
 More broadly, the bombardment shocked audiences because it jarred so strikingly 
with the generally positive images of Japan circulating over the previous decade. Back in the 
1850s news of Lord Elgin’s commercial treaty had been ‘proclaimed with a loud flourish of 
trumpets’; Laurence Oliphant’s highly-regarded Narrative of that expedition conveyed a 
delightfully romantic impression of the country.136 Visitors routinely praised its cleanliness 
and its climate, the chastity of its women and the ‘Englishness’ of the scenery, so that the 
advocates of military intervention found themselves colliding with ‘statements that Japan was 
like a garden of Eden…before Europeans entered the country…’.137 Indeed, Kagoshima 
renewed discussions as to where, precisely, Japan sat in the spectrum of ‘civilized’ and 
‘barbarous’ states, and what those indices of ‘civilization’ might be. The London Peace 
Society, for instance, thought the Japanese ‘in many respects as civilized as ourselves’; 
Cobden thought their bravery, ‘mechanical ingenuity’ and ‘progressive character’ to be ‘their 
best security against injustice’.138 Frederic Harrison went a step further, believing both 
‘Christian’ and ‘civilizational’ indices of human worth to have been forever tainted by the 
imperatives of empire: instead, from a humanitarian perspective, the Japanese were 
‘relatively our equals, occasionally our superiors, and essentially our brothers’.139 This was a 
minority concern, but the Kagoshima controversy did lead others to question the justice 
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forcing commercial treaties on Japan in the first place ‘in the teeth of all their strongest 
prejudices, and in defiance of their traditional policy’.140  
 In these circumstances, and with Britain seemingly ‘in the thick of a policy which 
involves itself in the affairs of every state from Finland to Sicily, and from Japan to the 
Caspian’, Kagoshima was taken up as a means to make broader attacks on Palmerston’s 
Government.141 While a motion of censure in March 1864 failed (partly because Cobden saw 
little prospect of besting his old antagonist this time, and pulled his punches), it nonetheless 
mobilised a broad range of opinion, and new critiques of empire.142 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil, 
for instance, dismissed as cant the government’s talk of merchants’ rights and free trade. 
Bombarding Kagoshima merely flattered its need to display its ‘warlike and heroic side’. This 
was … 
 
attractive to a Government like that of England at this moment, that is forced to 
shape all its foreign and all its domestic policy with a view of picking up stray votes 
in the House of Commons. The opportunity is most fascinating of coming forward at 
once as the champion of the British merchant and of the British flag – of uttering 
endless flourishes about Civis Romanus – and running all the while no risk of defeat 
nor even of embarrassing expenditure. Japan presents this union of advantages in a 
high degree…143 
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For Cecil, British intervention in Japan was part of a political offering of moral indignation 
and careless belligerence, tailored to the tastes of the middle class. Palmerston’s Radical 
opponents, in contrast, focused on the government’s role in whipping up outrage to 
‘hypnotise’ Parliament and the nation, distracting them from attending to the cause of reform 
at home.144 To them, the whole affair brought back memories of the Second Opium War 
(1856-60), and reaffirmed how merchant lobbying could deflect the course of British 
policy.145 This inspired a new wave of criticism of the behaviour of British merchants in 
Asia, and would see the unfortunate Mr Richardson himself recast as an avatar of merchant 
arrogance, intolerance and cupidity.146 
The Yokohama merchants responded indignantly, but nonetheless lost ground in 
London across the latter part of 1863. By bombarding Kagoshima, Palmerston’s government 
had touched a nerve. As yet another of Britain’s ‘semi-wars’, it compounded a wider feeling 
in the 1860s that international affairs were in crisis. Word of this reaction got back to Japan, 
where Mitsukuri Teiichirō translated coverage in the Yokohama press for circulation among 
high-ranking figures in the bakufu.147 Ultimately, the outcry was sufficient to warn Britain’s 
government against launching further unilateral operations in Japan. Late in 1863, Russell 
issued instructions that henceforth ‘no wanton injury should be inflicted upon the Japanese 
population’, nor even forts and batteries attacked if they be ‘surrounded by the dwellings and 
places of trade of the non-combatant inhabitants’.148 Japan, unlike China, would not become 
the object of sustained military attention.149 The whole experience, in fact, had been rather 
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For historians of Japan, and among the wider Japanese public, the killing of Charles 
Richardson and the clash at Kagoshima have a firm place in narratives of the Meiji Ishin. If 
they have seldom received attention from historians of empire, then one rare British treatment 
of the incident’s international implications has an explanation: ‘the overall importance to 
Britain of what occurred in Japan was small … What were Britain’s incidents were Japan’s 
major events’. This article has suggested that this does a disservice to the response these 
events inspired in Britain. For a time, the details of the affair – a dead British merchant, the 
celebrated Tōkaidō, a fledgling foreign settlement, a Royal Navy squadron, a city aflame – 
became evocative symbols in a wider debate over the nature and direction of British 
expansion.  
This article also warns against confusing the ultimate absence of imperial expansion 
with disinterest in its possibility. During the final years of Tokugawa rule, Japan became the 
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focus of attention of a variety of sub-imperial groups, and if they tended to struggle to get 
purchase, win influence or direct events, their frustrations have just as much to offer us, as 
historians of imperialism, as examples of protectorates, occupations and annexations elsewhere. 
Exploring the contingency, confusion and messiness of British expansion has become one of 
John Darwin’s signal contributions to the field. It was by taking this seriously, exploring its 
complexities, that he sought to take further the work of Ronald Robinson and John Gallagher, 
in particular.151 For a period, circumstances allowed Yokohama to act as a bridgehead of 
imperialism, and the private interests of its foreign merchants to be parlayed into an issue of 
wider, national interest. By exploring these conditions in detail – the activism of the merchant 
press, the power of the images it mobilised, the crisis of authority of the local British 
representative, poor communications, international acquiescence, and the skill of the ‘domestic 
bridgehead’ – as well as understanding how they were eclipsed, we enrich our understanding 
of expansion and its constraints. In that sense, thinking with a concept of the bridgehead can 
geographically expand the scope of imperial history into new, less-familiar locales. Imperial 
‘failures’, such as Japan would ultimately prove, do not merely offer a fresh take on the stresses 
and dynamics of imperial expansion. They also help us to locate British and other 
expansionisms within their global and not merely imperial contexts. 
If the case of bakumatsu Japan has much to offer scholars of imperial expansion, then 
there is plenty yet for imperial historians to contribute in return, by bringing Japan into more 
active dialogue with other situations of informal empire in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Historians of Japan, and also of Anglo-Japanese relations, have sensed as much, though they 
may not routinely use this terminology.152 In tracing the contours of the Richardson affair, we 
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can sketch out the limits of a window in time – perhaps from the late 1840s to the 1880s – in 
which British influence in Japan can be explored in much the same way as we might examine 
it in the eastern Mediterranean, or South America, or along the China coast, and alive to 
commonalities and connectivities between these settings. Doing so can offer a fresh perspective 
on old questions, and challenge some of the cherished exceptionalisms that have long featured 
in Japanese historical writing – from the story of the oyatoi gaikokujin, the thousands of foreign 
‘experts’ and assistants hired by the Meiji state (whose experiences take on a different 
complexion when viewed through the prisms of ‘imperial careering’ and informal empire), to 
re-framing mid-century diplomacy around the concept of anti-colonial ‘resistance’.153  The 
Victorians’ intervention in Japan may have proved limited in scope, and their interest in 
intervention fitful. But it nonetheless illuminates that ‘long chain of mundane activities’ that 
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